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COMMENT 
EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION ON THE 
BASIS OF PREGNANCY: RIGHTING THE 
POWER IMBALANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a working woman decides to have a child, recent 
laws allow her to take time off from work to give birth and 
raise the child for a specified time. Laws also exist that pro-
hibit gender discrimination in employment. Although these 
laws are a stride toward creating an equitable employment 
environment between men and women, they do not adequately 
address the legal problems a woman faces when she asserts 
her right to take maternity leave. 
When a woman exercises her legal right to take maternity 
leave, she often returns to a hostile environment, or returns to 
find out that her job no longer exists as Smith v. F. W. Morse, 
. Co., Inc demonstrates. l The position-elimination defense to a 
Title VII claim undermines Title VII's protections against em-
ployment discrimination of women who take maternity leave.2 
Although women have come a long way in their fight for equal 
rights, the end of the road is distant as long as this defense 
remains too broad and the plaintiffs burden remains too 
high.3 
1. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 418-419 (lst Cir. 1996) (per 
Selya J., concurring Bownes, J.). 
2. See infra part IV.B. 
3. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies in the United States 
and the European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal 
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L.J. 458, 465 (1991). 
223 
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In Smith v. F. W. Morse & Co. ,4 the First Circuit Court of 
Appeal refused to protect the plaintiff from discrimination 
based upon her pregnancy. Smith was terminated upon return-
ing from maternity leave and her employer claimed that 
Smith's job had become superfluous because the company reor-
ganized during her absence.5 The Smith court denied Smith's 
claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, "Title VII,,).6 Although United 
States Supreme Court precedent sets out two burden shifting 
frameworks for analyzing such cases, the Smith court blatantly 
circumvented that precedent in its decision.7 While failing to 
recognize the difficulty of Smith's evidentiary burden, the court 
found that Smith did not present a prima facie case of discrim-
ination based upon pregnancy. The court instead concluded 
that Smith's employer, F.W. Morse, presented sufficient evi-
dence under the position-elimination defense to support a find-
ing that, regardless of Smith's pregnancy leave, her position no 
longer existed after Morse's reorganization.8 
First, this comment will examine the problems with the 
position-elimination defense as illustrated by Smith v. F. W. 
Morse & Co.9 Since some reorganization is necessary when an 
employee takes leave, allowing an employer to offer this reor-
ganization effort as evidence of non-discriminatory intent cre-
ates a gap in Title VII protections. lO Next, the author will 
compare existing American federal family leave laws and Euro-
pean leave laws. 11 The comment will then use California's 
landlord-tenant law as a prototype for proposing an amend-
ment to existing maternity leave law that remedies the power 
distribution between dominant and subordinate individuals in 
a legal relationship. 12 
4. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413 (lst Cir. 1996). 
5. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418-419. 
6. Id. 
7. See infra parts ILA. & IV.A. 
8. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422-425. 
9. See infra parts III, IV.A-B. 
10. See infra note 87; see infra part V. When any employee cannot be at work 
for a prolonged period of time, an employer is forced to reorganize in order to 
make sure that the employee's work is completed. 
11. See infra part V.B. 
12. See infra part V.C. 
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The author will recommend expanding the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (hereinafter IFMLA")13 to include a 
180 day mandatory time period during which a returning 
mother's position is guaranteed which would more adequately 
equalize the power imbalance between an employer and em-
ployee.14 This proposed amendment would have the effect of 
protecting a woman returning from maternity leave from ter-
mination based upon her employer's putative retaliation. 15 
Finally, this comment will address the legal ramifications of 
expanding the protections set out in the FMLA.16 Since it is 
impossible to completely prevent retaliatory dismissal from 
occurring, the next best solution is to offer job protection for a 
specified time period to the returning working woman. 17 
II. BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII 
A. THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
If a plaintiff proceeds under a disparate impact theory, the 
burden-shifting framework, or "process of inquiry," for proving 
intentional discrimination will depend on the availability of 
direct evidence. IS If direct evidence equivalent to a "smoking 
13. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ensures up to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave for a variety of purposes, including birth or adoption of a child. 29 
U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West Supp. 1996). Examples of state laws that mandate materni-
ty leave are: California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, a comprehensive 
statute that inter alia requires an employer to provide female employees with 
unpaid pregnancy disability leave for up to four months; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 
(Deering Supp. 1996), Montana's Maternity Leave Act, a comprehensive act that 
inter alia provides that it is unlawful for an employer to deny a female employee 
the right to take maternity leave for a reasonable amount of time, MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 311 (1995); Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act, a 
comprehensive act that guarantees maternity leave. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
60(a)(7) (Supp. 1985). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See infra part V.D. 
17. See infra part V. 
18. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420-21 & n.3. The events leading up to the Smith case 
occurred before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub.L. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(c)(1)), established a right to trial by jury in Title VII cases. See also Fuller 
v. Phillips, 67 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995), wherein the circuit court in a racial 
discrimination context explained how the passage of "the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
[also] modified the burden-shifting scheme in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
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gun" does not exist, the plaintiff must attempt to prove her 
case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
work. 19 If direct evidence of discriminatory motive does exist, 
the plaintiff must apply the Price Waterhouse framework. 20 
1. The McDonnell Douglas Framework - Indirect Evidence 
Absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent, a plaintiff 
must prove the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
to make a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. The 
plaintiff must show 1) that the plaintiff is pregnant (or has 
indicated an intention to become pregnant), and 2) has sus-
tained a satisfactory job performance, but 3) the employer 
nonetheless dismissed her from her position while 4) continu-
ing to have her duties performed by a comparably qualified 
person.21 A rebuttable presumption that discrimination in-
duced the dismissal arises once the plaintiff has established 
the four prima facie elements.22 The burden then shifts to the 
employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for 
the dismissa1.23 If the employer "clears this modest hurdle," 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer's justification was a mere pretext for discrimina-
tion.24 
U.S. 228 (1989), making mixed-motive treatment more favorable to plaintiffs." See 
also Fields v. Clark Univ., 966 F.2d 49, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1052 (1993) (discussing the relevant standards). 
Although the definition of "direct evidence" is central to determining which 
standard the court should apply, the court simply made repeated references to 
"smoking gun" evidence without clearly defining what constitutes direct evidence of 
gender discrimination. Direct evidence was defined in Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 
900 F.2d 18. 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that direct evidence can be defined 
as evidence that shows a discriminatory animus). Direct evidence was also ex-
plained in the negative by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse as "excluding 
stray remarks in the workplace statements by non-decision makers or statements 
by decision unrelated to the decisional process itself." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring». 
19. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). 
20. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
21. Id. at 421 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 
22. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. (The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout to show 
4
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2. The Price Waterhouse Framework - Direct Evidence 
If direct evidence of discriminatory intent does exist, the 
Price Waterhouse framework applies.25 Statements made by 
an employer during a key decisional process can be direct evi-
dence of discrimination.26 Also, statements made outside of 
the decisional process may fit the definition of direct evi-
dence.27 For example, post-discharge statements made by a 
supervisor may constitute direct evidence of discrimination, 
even though they did not reflect an express intent to discrimi-
nate.28 In addition, statements made by an employer to third 
parties may be direct evidence of discriminatory animus. 29 
Under the Price Waterhouse framework, proof of direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent shifts the burden of persuasion 
from employee to employer.3o The employer then has the bur-
den of affirmatively proving that it would have made the same 
decision even if it had not taken the pregnancy into account.31 
Direct evidence of discrimination alone was not enough to 
impose Title VII liability on an employer in cases predating 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.32 Under today's 
that a discriminatory motive was the reason for the dismissal). 
25. Id. at 421 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258). This may be shown 
if the plaintiff produces direct evidence that the protected characteristic was a 
motivating factor in the employment action. For example, an admission by the 
employer that it explicitly took anticipated pregnancy into account in reaching an 
employment decision is direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. 
26. Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449-50. (8th Cir. 1993) 
(court referred to oral statements but later expanded its definition to include writ-
ten statements which included corporate planning documents). See also Beshears v. 
Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding statements during decisional 
process that older employees have problems adapting to change and to new poli-
cies was sufficient direct evidence). 
27. See Robinson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(statements made in lunch room). 
28. Id. 
29. E.E.O.C. v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1099-1071 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
30. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 431 (Bownes, J., concurring). At the time that the events occurred 
the law provided that an employer shown to have unlawfully discriminated could 
avoid Title VII liability if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it is shown that 
the adverse employment decision would have been the same even if discrimination 
had played no role. Id.; see also Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564-1565 
(9th Cir. 1994). This is different under current applicable law. The Civil Rights 
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applicable law, however, a plaintiff producing direct evidence 
of discrimination under Price Waterhouse may have a Title VII 
remedy.33 
The United States Supreme Court set out the above alter-
native analytical processes for courts to follow in discrimina-
tion cases in order to remedy even the most subtle forms of 
discrimination.34 Courts must strictly adhere to this precedent 
upon a claim of disparate impact in Title VII cases if the statu-
tory protections are to truly help women fighting pregnancy 
discrimination.35 
B. TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
Title VII provides, inter alia, that an employer shall not 
discharge an employee based upon that individual's gender.36 
In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court held that a state dis-
ability insurance program could exclude certain disabilities 
Act of 1991 modified the Price Waterhouse standard by making a mixed motives 
case more favorable to plaintiffs. Section 107 of the Act provides that Title VII is 
violated whenever an employer takes sex or pregnancy into account, regardless of 
whether other considerations independently explain the adverse employment deci-
sion. 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 1994). Furthermore, where an employer in a 
mixed motives case proves that it would have made the same decision, the pre-
vailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and declaratory and il\iunctive relief, 
but not damages or reinstatement. Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, 69 F.3d 1205, 
1210 (lst Cir. 1995) (citing 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (g)(2)(B) (West 1994)). 
33. Smith, 76 F.3d at 431. 
34. [d. at 430 (Bownes, J., concurring). 
35. [d. ("The District Court's decision to circumvent the analytical processes 
that the Supreme Court and Circuit precedent require should be criticized not 
praised"); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 V.S. 248, 255 
n.8 (1981). 
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 
1994). Title VII enacted in 1964, in pertinent part states: "[iJt shall be unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, religion, sex or national origin." [d. 
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibits discrimination in 
employment. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945 (Deering Supp. 1996). Wisconsin's Fair 
Employment Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of maternity leave. WIS. 
STAT. § 111.36 (Supp. 1996). Montana's Maternity Leave Act prohibits termination 
based on a woman's pregnancy. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1995). 
The first case in which the Supreme Court construed the provisions of Title 
VII was Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 V.S. 542 (1971). 
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from coverage.37 In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart fo-
cused his analysis on comparable short-term disabilities.3s 
Justice Stewart concluded that the state could rationally dis-
tinguish between the excluded disabilities and the covered 
disabilities based on the self-supporting nature of the program 
and its low cost to employees.39 In his dissent, Justice 
Brennan emphasized how the exclusion of pregnancy created 
one set of rules for males and another for females. 4O He point-
ed out that men are covered for prostatectomies, circumcision, 
hemophilia and gout, which are all primarily male afllic-
tions.41 
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, however, the United States 
Supreme Court decided that Title VII itself did not protect 
against pregnancy discrimination.42 In Gilbert, an employer's 
disability plan included benefits for nonoccupational sickness 
and accidents but excluded disabilities arising from pregnan-
cy.43 The Supreme Court determined that this plan did not 
involve gender discrimination.44 
This line of cases led to the amendment of Title VII to 
included the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (hereinafter 
"PDA,,)45 which set out to protect pregnant women from such 
forms of gender discrimination.46 Under Title VII as amended 
37. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). 
38.ld. 
39. ld. 
40. ld. at 501. 
41. ld. 
42. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). 
43. ld. at 128-129. 
44. ld. at 135. 
45. The 1978 enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended 
the definitional section of Title VII, providing in part that: 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in-
clude, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis 
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment - related purposes, including the receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, 
and nothing in section 703(h) of this Title [42 U.S.CA § 
2000e-2(h)] shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.CA § 2000e(k) (West 1994). 
46. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. The PDA states the terms "because of sex" or "on 
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by the PDA, an employee may proceed against an employer for 
wrongful termination on the basis of grounds set out in the 
PDA under either a disparate treatment theory or a disparate 
impact theory.47 If the plaintiff chooses to assert a claim un-
der a disparate treatment theory, she has the burden of prov-
ing that the employer purposefully terminated her because she 
was pregnant.48 Alternatively, a plaintiff may proceed under a 
disparate impact theory if the employment practice is facially 
neutral in its treatment of different groups but falls more 
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by 
business necessity.49 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Kathy Smith began working for Damar Plastics & Metal 
Fabricators, Inc. (hereinafter "Damar") in 1976 where she 
advanced to the position of production manager. Damar oper-
ated a job shop where it crafted custom parts for high - tech-
nology applications. On December 23, 1988, Chris Bond be-
came the new owner of F.W. Morse & Co. (hereinafter "Morse") 
after purchasing Morse's interest in the company. 50 Then F.W. 
Morse & Co. acquired Damar. 
Bond decided that Damar, now known as Morse, had too 
many managers.51 Although Smith did not have a managerial 
title most employees considered her to be a de facto manager 
due to the inadequacies of the production control manager.52 
the basis of sex" include "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (k) (West 1994). Furthermore, it provides that 
women affected by pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefits programs as other persons not so affected but similar in the 
inability to work. [d. 
47. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
575, 579-80 (1978). 
48. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. 
49. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). 
50. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 1996), 
51. [d. (The employees and their tasks included: Michael Hickman (production 
control); Robert Lane (shipping); Ronald Paradis (production/machining); Marc 
Shevenell (production/sheet metal); Gary Bickford (engineering); Michael Seeger 
(sales); and Kathy Smith). [d. 
52. [d. at 418. 
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During Bond's reorganization efforts, he fIred both the produc-
tion control manager and the shipping manager. 53 Bond then 
promoted Smith to a newly created position of "materials man-
ager.,,54 In addition to increased responsibility, Smith received 
two raises in pay.55 As a result of this reorganization, Bond 
claimed that the number of managers fell from seven to fIve. 56 
Shortly after Bond acquired Damar, Smith informed him 
that she was pregnant and intended to take maternity leave. 
Throughout meetings with management before her maternity 
leave, Smith was consistently told that her position with the 
company was "secure" and that Morse would make only tempo-
rary adjustments during her maternity absence. 57 Before 
Smith's maternity leave, management decided to distribute her 
duties among the other supervisors and a newly hired secre-
tary.58 Guimond additionally informed Smith that the termi-
nation of either the production/machining manager or the 
production/sheet metal manager would most likely occur and 
that Smith would once again receive a promotion upon her 
return from maternity leave.59 Also, Guimond informed her 
that the engineering manager would most likely be demoted 
and Smith would be asked to take on that responsibility.60 
On April 7, 1989, Kathy Smith began her maternity leave, 
planning to return to Morse after approximately six weeks.61 
Smith visited the plant on May 1, 1989 to inform her new 
general manager, Maryann Guimond, that she wished to re-
turn to work one week earlier than originally anticipated.62 At 
this meeting Guimond asked if Smith desired more children, to 
53. [d. 
54. [d. 
55. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418. (One of the raises took place in January and the 






60. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418. (Bond eliminated the engineering manager's posi-
tion yet kept Gary Bickford with Morse in a lower position). 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 419. (After the takeover, Guimond became the new general manager 
at Morse.) [d. at 418. 
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which Smith replied in the affirmative.63 A few days after the 
meeting, Guimond discussed with a co-worker Smith's personal 
plans to have more children.64 
On May 11, 1989, although Guimond had assured Smith 
repeatedly that her position was secure during her maternity 
leave, Smith was terminated.65 Ronald Paradis, the new oper-
ations manager, took on many of Smith's duties, while Marc 
Shevenell assumed the role of manufacturing manager. 66 
Guimond also promoted two low-ranking employees to assis-
tant manager positions.67 The secretary continued to maintain 
the clerical functions associated with Smith's former posi-
tion.68 In total, after the second phase of reorganization, 
Morse claimed that the plant had three second-echelon manag-
ers.69 
Shortly after her dismissal, Smith filed suit against Morse 
in New Hampshire Superior Court alleging breach of contract, 
wrongful discharge based on gender discrimination, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and discrimination based on 
Title VII. 70 Morse removed the case to federal district court 
based upon the Title VII claim.71 The district court granted 
Morse's motion for partial summary judgment on the common 
law wrongful discharge and the emotional distress claims.72 A 
jury heard the breach of contract claim, but at the close of 
Smith's case, the district court entered judgment as a matter of 
63. [d. at 419. 
64. [d. The co-worker with whom Guimond discussed this was Smith's sister, 
Kathy Vendas. [d .. 
65. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. Guimond testified that the reason Smith was fired 
was because her job had become superfluous during the reorganization. [d. 
66. [d. at 419. 
67. [d. (The court concluded that one of the two low-ranking employees had 
been assistant manger as far back as 1984 and that neither man received salary 
increases in connection with the new title). 
68. [d. 
69. [d. (Morse claimed that the managers and their duties were as follows: 
Paradis (operations); Shevenell (manufacturing); and Seeger (sales). He also stated 
that the seven original managers were replaced by three.) 
70. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. 
71. [d. Title VII invokes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1331, 1343(a)(3), 1441, 1446 (West 1992, 1993, 1994); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §1367 
(West 1993) (permitting ancillary jurisdiction over appended nonfederal claims). 
72. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. See Smith v F.W. Morse & Co., No. 90-361-S, slip 
op. at 12 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 1991) (unpublished). 
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law in Morse's favor on the breach of contract claim.73 
Several years later, the Title VII claim proceeded before 
the federal district court, which held that the elimination of 
the material manager's position and the ensuing dismissal of 
Smith were both part of a valid reorganization effort to make 
management more efficient.74 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that even if Smith had not been on maternity leave, her posi-
tion would no longer exist after the reorganization.75 Thus, 
Morse could not be held liable under Title VII for Smith's dis-
missal and the district court entered judgment for Morse, from 
which Smith filed this appea1.76 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE VII CLAIM 
A. THE COURT'S F AlLURE TO EMPLOY THE INITIAL PROCESS OF 
INQUIRY IN SMITH'S TITLE VII CLAIM 
Smith asserted that the district court erred when it decid-
ed that the totality of the evidence supported Morse's argu-
ment that gender discrimination did not trigger the firing.77 
In Title VII cases, the court must engage in a preliminary 
"process of inquiry" and determine which burden shifting 
framework applies to the case at bar.7s Rather than proceed 
with the analytical steps set out by the United States Supreme 
Court, the Smith court dismissed any inquiry into the direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent as a "difficult theoretical 
question.,,79 The court stated that "slavish insistence upon the 
process for its own sake serves only to exalt the trappings of 
justice over its substance."so By circumventing the initial pro-
cess of inquiry, the district court resolved the Title VII claim 
without ever deciding whether a prima facie case arose under 
73. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. 
74. [d. at 420. 
75. [d. 
76. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420; see also, Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 901 F. Supp. 
40, 45 (D.H.N. 1995). 
77. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. 
78. [d. at 420-421; see supra parts II.A.1-2 for explanation of Price Waterhouse 
and McDonnell Douglas frameworks. 
79. [d. at 421. 
80. [d. at 422. 
11
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either the McDonnell Douglas or the Price Waterhouse frame-
work.81 Instead, the court proceeded directly to its analysis of 
Morse's position-elimination defense. 
B. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF MORSE'S POSITION-ELIMINATION 
DEFENSE 
Under the position-elimination defense to a Title VII 
claim, an employer may eliminate a position during the course 
of downsizing even if the position is held by members who are 
protected by Title VII.82 The employer may not, however, use 
downsizing or streamlining as a pretext for dismissal when its 
true motivation stems from a discriminatory animus.83 
The district court found that Morse sustained its burden 
by showing that Smith's position would have been eliminated 
regardless of whether the she became pregnant, took a mater-
nity leave, or planned to bear more children.84 The court de-
cided that business judgment and economics unrelated to the 
pregnancy guided Morse's reorganization decision.85 The court 
also determined that even if the court assumed that Guimond 
considered Smith's pregnancy while making the decision to dis-
miss Smith, her position would have been eliminated anyway 
due to the disproportionately high number of managers in the 
company.86 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 422. 
83. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422. See also Quarantine v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 
62-63 (2nd Cir. 1995). This case illustrates an employer's use of the reorganization 
defense to a Title VII claim where an employee was told that her job would be 
available to her when she returned from maternity leave. The employee was told 
by her supervisor that she should stay at home with her child. When she wanted 
to return to work she was informed that her job had been eliminated but she was 
offered an inferior position. The employee found out later that her employer had 
been interviewing replacements before she went on leave and after she informed 
them of her intention to take the leave. Other female employees were given simi-
lar inferior positions, or were fired, when they returned from maternity leave. The 
Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had cause to go forward with her Title VII 
claim. Id. 
84. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423. 
85. Id. at 422 (citing Smith, 901 F. Supp. at 44). 
86. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422. 
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On appeal to the First Circuit, Smith asserted two argu-
ments.87 First, she argued that contrary to the district court's 
finding, Morse did not in fact eliminate her position because 
Morse had simply redistributed her work to other employ-
ees.88 The appellate court held, however, that the position-
elimination defense is not defeated simply because another em-
ployee, already on the payroll, is appointed to carry out some 
or even all of the dismissed employee's tasks.89 The elimina-
tion of a position does not necessarily mean "that the work the 
employee had been doing was superfluous and need not be 
performed at all.,,90 Rather, the employer most likely has de-
termined that things can run smoothly with one less worker.91 
The appellate court agreed that Smith's position was eliminat-
ed in order to streamline the management team, which is 
deemed a legitimate business decision rather than a discrimi-
natory one.92 
Second, Smith argued that Title VII prohibited Morse from 
dismissing her while she was on maternity leave even if he 
discovered that her position was unnecessary from a business 
standpoint.93 Smith cited Bond's testimony that because 
Smith was on' maternity leave, "Morse was able to discover 
that her position was expendable. »94 In short, Smith argued 
that Morse would not have realized the need to redistribute 
the managerial duties had Smith not been on maternity leave; 
hence, the leave brought about the firing.95 
The First Circuit found that the district court applied the 
appropriate legal standard.96 An employer may discharge any 
employee whether or not she is on maternity leave so long as it 





92. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423. The court found no evidence to suggest that 
Smith's fonner duties were taken over by Lupine or Hoffman and that the duties 
of Paradis, Shevenell, and Gilday were perfonned during Smith's leave continued 
to be perfonned by them after her dismissal. [d at 424. 
93. [d. at 424. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425. 
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does so for legitimate reasons unrelated to her pregnancy.97 
Title VII does not confer total immunity from dismissal during 
maternity leave.98 According to the majority, although Title 
VII mandates that an employer put aside an employee's preg-
nancy while making employment decisions, it does not require 
that employers ignore that employee's absence.99 The PDA 
does not force an employer "to pretend that absent employees 
are present whenever the cause of their absences is pregnan-
cy."lOO Title VII, as amended by the PDA, does not preclude 
an employer from articulating legitimate reasons for terminat-
ing a woman while she is on maternity leave. lOl Title VII is 
neither a "shield against this broad spectrum of employer accu-
sations nor a statutory guaranty of full employment."lo2 
Under this standard, the First Circuit found that the evi-
dence adequately supported the district court's fact finding 
that Smith's dismissal was not motivated by Smith's pregnan-
cy, maternity leave, or desire to bear more children. 103 The 
First Circuit cited several reasons supporting the district 
97. [d. at 424. 
98. [d. This case was brought under Title VII; had it been brought under the 
recently enacted Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 
Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654) (West Supp. 1996), Smith 
would have been more adequately protected under the 12-week mandatory leave 
provision. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425, n.8. See infra note 165. 
99. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425 (citing Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 
734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994). 
100. Smith, 76 F.3d at 424-425 (citing to Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys-
tems Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. III. 1993». A coincidence between the 
trait and the employment decision creates only an inference of discriminatory in-
tent which is not enough to give rise to a per se violation of the statute. Smith, 
76 F.3d at 425 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (l993». 
101. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425 (citing Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F. 
Supp. 1199, 1204 (D. Utah 1986». 
102. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425. 
103. [d. at 422, 429. The Court of Appeals has the ability to overturn a deci-
sion made by the District Court with regard to fact-finding if the body of evidence 
leads to the irresistible conclusion that a mistake was made by that court. Smith 
v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 1996). This "clearly erroneous" 
standard extends not only to fact finding but also to inferences drawn from the 
underlying facts. See Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (lst 
Cir. 1990). Appellate review does not reach fmdings regarding an actor's motiva-
tions if the trial court's reading of the record is plausible. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. 
See Foster v Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56-57 (lst Cir. 1995) (holding that findings re-
garding an actor's motivation fall within the shelter of Rule 52(a), and, therefore, 
if the trial court's reading of the record on such an issue is plausible, appellate 
review is at an end. See also, FED. R. ClY. P. 52(a). 
14
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court's decision. 104 First, the testimony and all supporting 
evidence supported the argument that the position was ex-
pendable. l05 Second, any other elimination decision would en-
tail a loss of engineering expertise because many of the other 
employees had an engineering background. 106 Third, 
Guimond gave Smith increases in pay and new significant 
responsibilities, while dismissing other managers. 107 The 
court found that Morse's treatment of Smith was inconsistent 
with a bias against pregnant employees. 108 
The First Circuit also pointed out that the trier of fact has 
the right to credit certain testimony and discredit other testi-
mony.l09 In this case, the district court chose to credit Bond's 
testimony that the maternity leave never played a role in 
Smith's dismissal because the position would no longer have 
existed due to the reorganization. llo The district court also 
credited Guimond and Bond's testimony that Damar's organi-
zation structure defied logic. lll Since two permissible views of 
the evidence existed, the district court had no room to find 
error with the fact finder's choice between them. l12 The First 
Circuit upheld the district court's decision, 113 acknowledging 
that the Title VII claim presented a close question, but because 
the standard of review is generous, there was enough evidence 
to support the district court's findings. 114 
C. THE CONCURRENCE 
In his concurrence, Justice Bownes found fault with the 
majority's analysis of the Title VII claim.1l5 Justice Bownes 





109. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 422. 
112. Id. at 423 (citing Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1138 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985». 
113. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422. 
114. Id. 
115. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 429 (1st Cir. 1996) (Bownes, J., 
concurring). 
15
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disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the causation 
requirement under Title VII, and with Morse's position-elimi-
nation defense. u6 Justice Bownes observed that the 
majority's interpretation failed to remedy "discrimination 
against women who take or plan to take maternity leave."117 
Justice Bownes found that the district court and the ma-
jority did not proceed with the "process of inquiry" required by 
a showing of direct evidence under Title VII case law. us 
Bownes believed that Smith produced enough direct evidence 
at the outset to trigger the Price Waterhouse analysis. U9 In 
addition, even if the majority rejected the usage of the Price 
Waterhouse standard, it is irrefutable that Smith established 
the prima facie elements of the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard. 120 Therefore, Bownes sharply criticized the majority's 
affirmation of the district court's failure to proceed under ei-
ther framework. 121 
Although Bownes disagreed with the majority's analysis in 
its failure to apply either the Price Waterhouse or the 
McDonnell Douglas standard, he found that the holding was 
not clearly erroneous under current case law. 122 Bownes stat-
ed that the precedent in this area of law imposes too heavy a 
burden on plaintiffs trying to prove that the employer inten-
tionally discriminated on the basis of a Title VII-protected 
trait. 123 
1. Direct Evidence and the Price Waterhouse Framework 
Bownes found that the statements made to Smith by peo-
ple such as Guimond, who was solely responsible for Morse's 
personnel decisions, qualified as direct evidence of discrimina-
116. [d. at 429. 
117. [d. at 430. 
118. [d. (Bownes, J., concurring). A court has the choice of analyzing under the 
Price Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas standard in deciding discrimination cases 
based upon the existence of direct evidence. See supra part II.A.1-2. 
119. 1d. at 431. 
120. Smith, 76 F.3d at 433. 
121. [d. at 430. 
122. [d. at 431. 
123. [d. at 430. 
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tory animus. 124 After repeated assurances of job security, 
Guimond questioned another employee about Smith's future 
childbearing plans and within two weeks of learning of Smith's 
future plans, decided to terminate her. 125 Under the suggest-
ed definition, these facts show that the timing of the decision 
to terminate Smith was suspicious and should have been ana-
lyzed under the Price Waterhouse framework. 126 
2. The McDonnell Douglas framework 
Bownes stated that even if the majority rejected Justice 
O'Connor's definition of direct evidence thereby refusing to 
apply the Price Waterhouse framework, Smith made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Doug-
las standard. 127 To establish a prima facie case, the employee 
must show that 1) she was directly asked of an intention to 
become pregnant in the future, 2) she had a more than satis-
factory job performance, 3) she has been given repeated assur-
ance of job security, and 4) performance of the duties of the 
dismissed individual by comparably qualified individuals con-
tinues after her dismissal. 128 Smith had been asked of her in-
tention to have more children, she was an excellent manager, 
she had been assured that her job would be waiting upon her 
return, and her duties were distributed among other employees 
during her absence.129 With these facts, Bownes reasoned 
that Smith met her burden under McDonnell Douglas; 
therefore the district court should have analyzed the facts 
under this framework before finding Smith's evidence of dis-
crimination deficient. 130 
3. Causation in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases 
Under the disparate treatment theory, Smith had the 




128. Id. (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 153 
(1st Cir. 1990». 
129. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418, 433. 
130. Id. 
17
Riede: Pregnancy Discrimination, Women's Law Forum
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
240 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:223 
burden of proving that Morse terminated her because of her 
pregnancy.131 The majority concluded that the "coincidence" 
between pregnancy leave and employment decisions by itself 
did not meet this causation requirement. 132 Bownes found, 
however, that this may be true in some cases but that the 
"coincidence" in this case arguably proved intentional discrimi-
nation. 133 The majority's discussion ignored the difficulty 
posed in these circumstances; that maternity leave gives an 
employer the opportunity to discharge women who take it, or 
who express an intention to have children. 134 
Bownes reasoned that although Smith's position may have 
been eliminated even if Morse had not considered Smith's 
family plans, Smith herself may not have been fired. 135 
Though Bond and Guimond discussed eliminating the mate-
rials manager's position, the record shows that they had every 
intention of retaining Smith because of her excellent skills. 136 
Bond actually testified that Smith would still be employed at 
Morse had she not taken maternity leave.137 Also, Guimond 
was very concerned about the disruption that Smith's materni-
ty leave would cause the company.138 Thus, Smith established 
that her termination was in large part brought about by her 
employer's consideration of her pregnancy and not merely 
because a particular position was eliminated.139 As pregnancy 
laws do not fully shield plaintiffs from adverse employment 
decisions, likewise business judgment or necessity should not 
exempt employers from Title VII's limitations. 140 
4. The Position-Elimination Defense 
Bownes disagreed with the majority's broad interpretation 
of the position-elimination defense. 141 Bownes contested the 








139. [d. at 434. 
140. Smith, 76 F.3d at 435. 
141. [d. The majority implies that as long as a company is able to manage in 
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majority's decision under this defense in two ways: first, he did 
not agree that Morse in fact reduced the size of its manage-
ment team, and second, he found fault in the majority's related 
work requirement analysis under the First Circuit case Le 
Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co. 142 
First, Bownes did not find that Morse reduced the size of 
its management but rather, that the majority miscalculated 
the numbers. l43 The facts suggest that Morse merely reorga-
nized his team by consolidating positions and eliminating titles 
but not by decreasing the size of its management. l44 The ma-
jority failed to include Bond and Guimond in its final count, as 
well as two assistant managerial positions, even though the 
individuals holding those slots did have management titles. 145 
Also, the majority erroneously included Smith in Damar's 
original management team even though she never had a 
manager's title. 146 If these corrections are made to the 
majority's final count, the number rises back to seven. 147 
Bownes did not agree that this evidence was enough to rebut a 
claim of intentional discrimination in every case. l48 However, 
since it was plausible for the district court to interpret this 
reorganization as position-elimination, Bownes concurred with 
the majority's holding.149 
Second, Bownes stated that the period of inquiry for the 
related work requirement should be before the maternity leave 
in order to accurately assess the facts surrounding the dismiss-
al. 150 Citing to Le Blanc, Bownes reasoned that an employee 
cannot defeat the position-elimination defense by a claim that: 
the absence of one of its key members, proof of a nondiscriminatory purpose ex-
ists. [d. 
142. [d.; Le Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (lst Cir. 1993). An em-
ployee can meet the related work requirement by showing that plaintiff's duties 
were shifted to employees already performing those or similar duties. [d. at 436. 
143. Smith, 76 F.3d at 435 (Bownes, J., concurring). 
144. [d. 
145. [d. The majority found that Morse reduced its management team from 
seven to three. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. Smith, 76 F.3d at 435 (Bownes, J., concurring). 
148. [d. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. at 436. 
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1) "an employee was only 'replaced' because 'another employee 
[was] assigned to perform the plaintiff's duties in addition to 
other duties,'" or 2) "'[because] the work was redistributed 
among other existing employees already performing related 
work.'" 151 Bownes contended that Morse's defense would fail 
under the second Le Blanc scenario, unless Morse could prove 
that it distributed the plaintiff's duties among employees who 
were already performing some of those duties, or similar 
duties. 152 Bownes found that during the second wave of reor-
ganization, Smith's duties were actually transferred to employ-
ees who were not previously performing Smith's tasks or relat-
ed tasks before Smith began her maternity leave. 153 
If the court focuses on events that occurred during a 
woman's maternity leave, it will almost always be true that 
someone else will be performing their duties in order to com-
pensate for that woman's temporary absence. 154 Thus, accord-
ing to Bownes, under Le Blanc, the relevant period of inquiry 
into whether the duties formerly performed by a plaintiff were 
assumed by someone already performing related work should 
be made before the leave begins. Otherwise, as in Smith, the 
facts will consistently favor the employer under the related 
work requirement. 155 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
The biological fact that only women have the ability to 
bear children has been historically used to differentiate women 
from men along social, psychological and emotional lines,156 
and consequently, to justify their exclusion from the male pub-
lic world. 157 Even now that some barriers are beginning to 
break down, pregnancy discrimination remains an obstacle to 
151. [d. at 435-36 (citing Le Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 
1993». 




156. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 37 (1985). 
157. [d. 
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equal opportunity for women. ISS 
Not until 1910 did more than twenty percent of the fe-
male population work outside the home, and most of those 
women were single or widowed; today, women work outside the 
home in approximately the same numbers as men. 1S9 During 
1995, over four thousand women filed pregnancy discrimina-
tion complaints with the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission, which constituted a 40% increase 
since 1991.160 Thus, the need to hone the laws that promote 
women's freedom of choice to have a family while working is 
more pressing than ever before. Though Title VII and the 
FMLA were strong strides toward eliminating the imbalance in 
the employer-employee relationship, the legislature must ex-
pand the scope of their protection even more by mandating 
that a woman is guaranteed her position for a specified time 
once she returns from maternity leave. 
A. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993 
A woman has the right to take maternity leave under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (hereinafter, "FMLA,,).161 Cov-
ered employees are entitled to take up to twelve work weeks of 
unpaid leave during any twelve-month period in order to give 
birth to a child or to care for a child.162 During the period 
158. [d. 
159. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies.[n The United States 
and The European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal 
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L. J. 458, 459 (1990-1991). 
160. Kelly King Alexander, Labor Pains: Pregnancy Can Be A Precarious Situa-
tion For Employee and Employer, 14 Bus. DATELINE; GREATER BATON ROUGE Bus. 
REP., No.8; Sec 1; pg. 28 (Nov. 28, 1995). 
161. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West Supp. 1996) 
states in pertinent part: 
[d. 
(a)(1) Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible 
employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of 
leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the 
following: 
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the 
employee or in order to care for such son or daugh-
ter. 
162. [d. The act also covers leave for the care of a foster child, a family mem-
ber with a serious health problem, or the employee's own serious health problem. 
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that the employee is on leave, the employer must continue 
paying the employee's health benefits.163 In addition, the em-
ployer must, except under certain circumstances, reinstate the 
employee to the same position or an equivalent position with 
equivalent benefits, pay, and other conditions of employ-
ment. l64 Most employees remain uncovered fly the FMLA be-
cause it only pertains to employers with 50 or more employees 
working within a seventy-five mile range and also exCludes 
federal officers or employees. 165 Consequently, only five per-
cent of American businesses are covered by the FMLA.166 
[d. 
163. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (c)(1) (West Supp. 1994) ("the employer shall maintain 
coverage under any group health plan"). 
[d. 
164. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1), (b)(l) (1994): 
(a)(l) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
any eligible employee who takes leave under section 2612 
of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall be 
entitled, on return from such leave -
(A) to be restored by the employer to the position 
of employment held by the employee when the 
leave commenced; or 
(B) to be restored to an equivalent position with 
equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other 
terms and conditions of employment 
(b)(l) [A]n employer may deny restoration under subsec-
tion (a) of this section to any eligible employee described 
in paragraph (2) if, 
(A) such denial is necessary to prevent substantial 
and previous economic injury to the operation of the 
employer; 
(B) the employer notifies the employee of the intent 
of the employer to deny restoration on such basis 
at the time the employer determines that such inju-
ry would occur; 
(C) in any case in which the leave has commenced, 
the employee elects not to return to employment 
after receiving such notice. 
165. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating the exclu-
sions to the eligible employee in general). 
166. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Com-
parative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331, 351 (Winter 1995) (cit-
ing to Hearing on H.R. 1, The Family and Medical Leave Act Before the 
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and 
Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1993) (statement of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of 
Labor». See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1993) (enumerating 
the conditions to be a statutory eligible employee). The FMLA covers employees 
who have been employed for at least twelve months by the employer from whom 
leave is requested and who have worked at least 1250 hours for the employer 
during the previous twelve-month period. [d. Some states have enacted Family and 
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Under Title VII, a woman who plans to take maternity 
leave is protected from pregnancy discrimination. 167 The 
FMLA provides that an employer must give maternity leave 
for a specified time and offer the woman's job back to her when 
she returns from her leave.168 Should these safeguards fail, 
the Court laid out 11 "process of inquiry" that courts must apply 
when reviewing a Title VII action for sex discrimination. 169 
Yet, even with these protections in place, Kathy Smith's em-
ployer escaped liability for discrimination against Smith based 
on her pregnancy. 
B. GERMAN FAMILY LEAVE 
In order to strengthen pregnancy discrimination laws in 
the United States a mandatory protection period should be 
adopted similar to Germany family leave laws. Germany's laws 
were used as a point of comparison during the FMLA legisla-
tive debates because Germany has the strongest economy in 
the Western European countries. 170 In drafting its social leg-
islation, the German lawmakers considered how the legislation 
would affect families rather than focus on the effect on the 
business sector.l7l As evinced by broader protection for preg-
nant women, Germany placed a higher priority on family than 
economic factors when determining its leave laws. However, by 
allowing the employer to assert the position-elimination 
defense, the United States Congress appears more concerned 
with the freedom of employers to make business decisions than 
with adequately protecting pregnant women from discrimina-
tion. 
Medical Leave policies that cover employers with fewer employees. See, e.g., 
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, covering employers with five or 
more employees. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945 (Deering Supp. 1996). 
167. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994). 
168. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (West Supp. 1996). 
169. See supra part II.A.1-2. 
170. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Com-
parative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 353. 
171. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Com-
parative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 344 (citing to Ronald 
Brickman, et al., Controlling Chemicals 40 (1985» (stating that the "virtual neglect 
of formal cost-benefit analysis in European decision making presents a striking 
contrast" to the United States procedure). 
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Currently, Germany has three laws that resemble the 
FMLA in the United States: the Maternity Leave Act, the 
Parental Leave and Support Act, and the Sick Leave Act. 172 
The Maternity Leave Act now provides for job-guaranteed, paid 
maternity leave.173 The Parental Leave and Support Act pro-
vides for up to three years of job-secured parental leave.174 By 
offering "parental" leave, Germany shows that their laws 
which were originally rooted in traditional gendered values, 
now recognize modern breakdown of gendered roles in the 
home and in parenting. 175 This law protects the employee 
from termination; however, the employer may terminate the 
employment relationship at the end of the leave, but only if the 
employee receives notice three months prior to the termina-
tion. 176 The Sick Leave Act entitles an employee to paid 
leave , 177 which is paid by the employer who is then reim-
bursed in part by its insurers.178 
172. [d. 
173. [d. at 335 (citing Mutterschutzgesetz MuSchG 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl.) I 1179 (Gennany). 20 Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 
345 (Although this law was initially passed to protect women workers from the 
dangers of working while pregnant during the industrial revolution, in 1878, the 
law has changed and now serves the purpose of providing leave to pregnant wom-
en and has lost its paternalistic intent). 
174. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Com-
parative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 335 (citing 
Bundeserziehungsgeldesetz BErzGG 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1.) I 180 (Genna-
ny). 
175. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Com-
parative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 345. Originally providing 
"mothers with the opportunity to extend the period of leave from work to six 
months. Now the law's intent has changed to provide parents with a greater de-
gree of choice in balancing the demands of work and family, thereby strengthening 
their ability to raise their children properly." [d. By not mandating which parent 
may take maternity leave, Gennany has demonstrated a more progressive and 
realistic approach towards women's dual role in both the home and in the 
workplace. 
176. [d. at 349 '(citing to BErzGG sections 5(1), 18 (1)-(2), 19, 1994 BGBl. I 180 
(Gennany». 
177. [d. at 335. The original intent of the Sick Leave Act was to provide free 
medical treatment while maintaining a percentage of the employee's pay during 
the illness for a fIxed period of time. This is in stark contrast to the purposes of 
the FMLA in the United States which includes balancing the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families, providing reasonable leave and promoting 
equal employment opportunities, while accommodating legitimate employer inter-
ests as much as possible. [d. at 346-47. 
178. [d. at 350-51. 
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If the United States legislature intends to adequately 
protect women from employment discrimination, its laws 
should similarly place a higher priority on family relations 
than purely on the employer's business freedom by amending 
the FMLA to include a lBO-day mandatory protection period. 
C. EXPANDING THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT TO 
INCLUDE A 180 DAY JOB PROTECTION PERIOD 
In most states, employment is presumed to be at-will 
which allows an employer or employee to terminate employ-
ment at any time.179 This. rule creates a problem when an 
employer has a hidden discriminatory motive and knows that 
the position-elimination defense may be easily asserted. Al-
though both employer and employee have the power to termi-
nate employment at any time, a power imbalance exists when 
an employer terminates an employee because of a hidden dis-
criminatory motive. 
Some laws already compensate for such power imbalances 
in other legal relationships, such as the California law that 
protects tenants from retaliatory eviction when they file a com-
plaint with the Housing Authority.1so In California Civil Code 
Section 1942.5, a tenant has protection from a lessor's 
retaliation for 180 days past the date upon which the tenant 
files a formal complaint against the lessor with the appropriate 
agency.1S1 The California legislature deemed 180 days suffi-
179. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies In The United States 
and The European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal 
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L.J. at 493 n.182. "The employment at-will doctrine is 
traditional common law still in force today." Id. 
180. See infra note 181. 
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1996) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) If the lessor retaliates against the lessee because of 
the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter 
or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as 
to the tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a 
dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent, 
the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in 
any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to quit involun-
tarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within 
180 days: 
(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good 
faith, has given notice pursuant to Section 1942, or has 
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cient time to adequately ameliorate the problems that could 
arise in such circumstances. In this way, the California legisla-
ture has remedied the effects of the power imbalance in the 
landlord/tenant relationship when a tenant exercises her rights 
under law. 182 
Likewise, the 180 day mandatory protection period should 
balance the power between the pregnant employee and her 
employer. l83 A pregnant woman's only protection against dis-
crimination is Title VII, which prohibits her employer from 
firing her merely on the basis of her pregnancy or for some 
reason that is really a guise for discrimination. l84 The Family 
and Medical Leave Act states that an employee generally has 
the right to return to the same position or an equivalent posi-
tion with equivalent pay, benefits and working conditions at 
the conclusion of the leave. 185 These provisions would be 
[d. 
made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding 
tenantability; or 
(2) After the date upon which the lessee. in good 
faith. has filed a written complaint. or an oral complaint 
which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing. with 
an appropriate agency. of which other lessor has notice. 
for the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition re-
lating to tenantability; or 
(3) After the date of an inspection of issuance of a 
citation. resulting from a complaint described in para-
graph (2) of which the lessor did not have notice; or 
(4) After the filing of appropriate documents com-
mencing a judicial or arbitration proceeding involving the 
issue of tenability; or 
(5) After entry of judgment or the signing of an 
arbitration award. if any. when the judicial proceeding or 
arbitration the issue of tenability is determined adversely 
to the lessor. 
In each instance. the 180-day period shall run from 
the latest applicable date referred to in paragraphs (1) to 
(5). inclusive. 
(b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of subdivision 
(a) more than once in any 12-month period. 
182. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Tentative Draft 
1969). 
183. This is not to say that an employer is completely prohibited from termi-
nating the employment of a woman returning from maternity leave. Obviously 
certain exceptions exist which can be found in the employment contract of the 
employee. 
184. See supra note 36. 
185. See supra part V.A. 
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more effective were a similar mandatory time period added 
during which the returning woman is guaranteed her position. 
D. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE FAMILY AND MEDI-
CAL LEAVE ACT TO INCLUDE A 180 DAY JOB PROTECTION PERI-
OD 
Similar protection from an employer's retaliatory termina-
tion when a woman exercises her legal right to take maternity 
leave must be integrated into the existing FMLA.186 An ex-
pansion to the FMLA would be placed after the clause: "An 
employee generally has a right to return to the same position 
or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, benefits and 
working conditions at the conclusion of the leave. ,,187 The 
clause would say in pertinent part, that an employer may not 
terminate the employee returning from leave for 180 days past 
the date that the employee returns from the leave. 
This is not to say that an employer is completely barred 
from terminating the employment of a woman returning from 
maternity leave. Obviously, certain exceptions exist which can 
be found in the employment contract of the employee. By pro-
viding an expansion to the FMLA analogous to California's 
Remedies For Lessor's Retaliation, a woman would be better 
protected from termination based on her maternity leave when 
she returns to work. 
Senator Williams, in favor of Title VII, as amended by the 
PDA, stated that: "the entire thrust ... behind this legislation 
is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and 
equally in the work force, without denying them the funda-
mental right to full participation in family life. ,,188 The 
author's proposal will fulfill this purpose by lowering the 
plaintiff's burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework, by 
raising the employer's burden under the Price Waterhouse 
framework, and by raising the burden for employers asserting 
186. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (West Supp. 1996); see 
supra note 161. 
187. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614(a)(1). 
188. 123 Congo Rec. 29,658 (1977). 
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the position-elimination defense. The author's recommenda-
tions would better achieve the goal of gender equality in the 
workforce by expanding legal protection in federal law for 
pregnant women. 
1. Lowering the Plaintiff's Burden under the McDonnell Doug-
las Framework 
Under the proposed amendment, the employee returning 
from maternity leave will have a lower burden when asserting 
her prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Under the second requirement that she had a satisfactory job 
performance, the plaintiff who has been reincorporated into the 
workforce will have an easier time meeting this burden be-
cause she has been working after her maternity leave. 189 
Court~ could more easily recognize an employer with a hidden 
discriminatory motive for firing an employee who was once 
highly regarded and who continued to work at the same perfor-
mance level after her return from maternity leave. 
For example, consider an employee such as Kathy Smith, 
an employee who received promotions and pay raises before re-
questing maternity leave and before vocalizing her intent to 
become pregnant in the future. 19o If Smith had received her 
job back after the leave she would have been able to continue 
to perform at such a high level. Consequently, if Morse fired 
her after her return, she would be armed with evidence of the 
necessity of her position and her value as an employee. 
2. Raising the Employer's Burden Under the Price Waterhouse 
Framework 
Under the proposed amendment, an employer will also 
have to meet a higher burden under the Price Waterhouse 
framework. Under Price Waterhouse, if the plaintiff can show 
direct evidence of discrimination, the burden of persuasion 
189. Smith, 76 F.3d at 430 (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 
902 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 1990». 
190. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418 (Smith received promotions and pay raises up to 
twenty-five percent). 
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shifts from employee to employer.191 The employer then has 
the burden of affirmatively proving that it would have made 
the same decision even if it had not taken the pregnancy into 
account. 192 
Again, consider an employee like Kathy Smith who was a 
proven, valued employee before her maternity leave and who 
vocalized her intention to become pregnant in the future. 193 If 
Smith had returned to her job under this author's proposed 
mandatory job protection period, Morse would have had diffi-
culty proving that they fired her without regard to her preg-
nancy. The court would consider that Smith was working at 
the same performance level before and after the leave. Fur-
thermore, the fact finder would consider that she received 
promotions and pay raises before the leave yet, while continu-
ing to work at the same high level, was dismissed after the 
leave. If a discriminatory motive was present, the 180 day job 
protection period would uncover it for any fact finder to see. 
3. Raising the Burden for Employers Asserting the Position-
Elimination Defense 
The Smith case illustrates how easily an employer can 
disguise a discriminatory motive by asserting the position-
elimination defense. 194 An amendment allowing protection for 
180 days commencing from the day a woman returns from 
maternity leave would raise the employer's burden under the 
position-elimination defense. 
Usually some internal reorganization and work redistribu-
tion is necessary when a woman takes maternity leave. Under 
the position-elimination defense, as indicated by the Smith 
decision, the employer need only present evidence of this shuf-
fling of tasks and simply cast it as mere coincidence in order to 
show the company's imminent plans for reorganization. Such 
easy perversion of the employer's intent under the position-
elimination defense allows the employer to easily meet its burden. 
191. [d. at 42l. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. at 418. 
194. See supra parts IV.B. & IV.CA. 
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This problem would not exist if the FMLA were expanded 
to include this period of job protection. Once a woman returned 
from her maternity leave, the employer would be required to 
give her position, or a very similar position, back to her for at 
least 180 days. Consequently, the employee returning from 
maternity leave has resumed her normal job tasks. This 
equalizes her position relative to other employees by bringing 
her back to her status before the leave. The employee will have 
the opportunity to demonstrate that she and her position are 
valued thereby making the elimination of her position more 
suspicious. Furthermore, if the employer still wishes to dis-
miss the returning woman he is faced with the difficulty and 
high cost of training a new employee. 
Also, this reorganization would take place when the wom-
an is actually working for the employer not when she is absent 
which would limit more terminations to only those involving 
legitimate reorganization efforts. Once the statutory time peri-
od expires, it will be more difficult to reorganize without her 
and more difficult to prove that her position would have been 
eliminated without regard to her pregnancy. 
As Justice Bownes stated, the majority's opinion, "could 
erroneously be viewed as an invitation to use ... [the position-
elimination] defense as a cover for discrimination against wom-
en who take or plan to take maternity leave.,,195 This added 
protection will not shelter every woman who takes maternity 
leave from discrimination, but it will expose more subtle inci-
dents of discrimination which persist under the current laws. 
As the Smith decision demonstrates, the employer's evi-
dentiary burden under this defense is relatively low compared 
to the plaintiffs burden, especially when the court refuses to 
properly assess the validity of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 
Absent strict adherence to Supreme Court precedent regarding 
the initial factual inquiry, such a discrepancy creates an al-
most insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs when an employer is 
able to produce minimal evidence as to some legitimate busi-
ness purpose for eliminating the position. 
195. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429-30 (Bownes, J., concurring). 
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"In this case, if Smith had not become pregnant and taken 
maternity leave, she would still be a valued Morse employ-
ee."l96 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If federal law provided Smith with job protection for 180 
days past the time that she returned from maternity leave, 
Smith would have been integrated back into the work place. 
Therefore, Morse would have been less apt to fire Smith be-
cause it would have been more difficult and more costly to 
bring in a new employee to complete her tasks. Alternatively, 
if Morse still decided to dismiss Smith after the 180 period, 
Smith would have met her burden of proving the prima facie 
elements of discrimination in a subsequent lawsuit. In addi-
tion, it would have been much more difficult for Morse to as-
sert the position-elimination defense. Smith would have re-
turned to her position and would have demonstrated to Morse 
that her work was of high caliber and worthy of respect and 
recognition. 
Smith is one of thousands of women who face discrimina-
tion after they return from maternity leave. Currently, our 
laws do protect against blatant discrimination; however, they 
do not prevent more subtle forms of discrimination from harm-
ing working mothers. With the modification to the FMLA set 
out in this article, the power distribution between employer 
and employee will be better balanced and pregnant women will 
no longer be penalized for starting a family while working for a 
living. 
Victoria R. Riede' 
196. Smith, at 76 F.3d at 436. 
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